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History

Higher level and standard level

Paper 1 – source booklet

Wednesday 4 May 2022 (afternoon)

1 hour

Instructions to candidates

- Do not open this source booklet until instructed to do so.
- This source booklet contains the sources required for history higher level and standard level paper 1.
- Read all the sources from one prescribed subject.
- The sources in this paper may have been edited and/or abridged: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ... ; minor changes are not indicated.

| Prescribed subject | Sources |
|------------------------------|---------|
| 1: Military leaders | A – D |
| 2: Conquest and its impact | E – H |
| 3: The move to global war | I – L |
| 4: Rights and protest | M – P |
| 5: Conflict and intervention | Q – T |

Prescribed subject 1: Military leaders

Read sources A to D and answer questions 1 to 4. The sources and questions relate to case study 2: Richard I of England (1173–1199) — Impact: Political impact in England: absence of the king; political instability; revolt of John and Philip in Richard’s absence.

Source A

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Source B

An image depicting John and his brother Richard I, while their mother, Eleanor of Aquitaine, looks on, from the engraving *Prince John’s Submission to Richard I* (1795).



[Source: After Benjamin West PRA - Prince John’s Submission to Richard I, 1795, Line engraving, 28.6 x 20.9 cm. Photo credit: © Royal Academy of Arts, London.]

Source C William of Newburgh, a 12th century historian, writing in the chronicle *The History of English Affairs* (completed c1198).

John did not stop at this time from harassing his brother, and was a firm supporter of the king of France in all things. For while the king of France was devastating the Norman territory, John was disturbing the provinces of England with troops of criminals. But the nobles of the kingdom, firm in faith, and unbroken in spirit, gathered an impressive body of soldiers. They opposed the lawless attempts of this mad-headed youth [John]. Besieging the castle of Windsor, which had fallen under John's power, they compelled it to surrender. But when John saw his supporters, whom he could not assist, exposed to the dangers of a siege, he requested a treaty for their safety, and gave up the castle.

Source D

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End of prescribed subject 1

Prescribed subject 2: Conquest and its impact


Read sources E to H and answer questions 5 to 8. The sources and questions relate to case study 1: The final stages of Muslim rule in Spain — Context and motives: Political context in Iberia and Al-Andalus in the late 15th century; internal conflicts and alliances in Granada in the late 15th century.

Source E Max von Habsburg, an historian, writing in the school textbook *Spain in the Age of Discovery, 1469–1598* (2015).

The Iberian Peninsula lacked both political unity and a uniform system of government and there was not even a willingness, let alone any attempt, to centralize the governmental systems. In fact, “Spain” was no more than a geographical expression and the term was not used at the time. Setting aside Portugal, which remained a separate kingdom, the provinces of Castile and Aragon were dominant in political and economic terms and were also recognized as independent kingdoms. They contained over 75% of the Iberian Peninsula’s population. The Castilian monarchy held greater political power than its counterpart in Aragon. Yet in the second half of the 15th century, both provinces were weakened by civil wars. Motivated by a disputed succession [to the thrones], powerful nobles challenged the authority of Henry IV of Castile and John II of Aragon respectively ... The marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella did not result in an immediate end to civil war and rivalries between the nobles, leaving the Iberian Peninsula very unstable. The power of the nobles was so strong that they tried to fill the vacuum created by political problems and to control decisions made by the king. The nobility were powerful but remained divided.

[Source: Max von Habsburg *Spain in the Age of Discovery, 1469–1598 A/AS Level History for AQA Student Book*, © Cambridge University Press 2015. Reproduced with permission of The Licensor through PLSclear.]

Source F A map of the kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula up to 1492.



Source G

Mosen Diego de Valera, warrior, poet and writer in his *Compiled Letters*. Extract of Letter XXI [21] to the Catholic Monarchs (c1485).

It's God's hand that will give you victory because the Moors are so confident and arrogant about their past that they will risk everything. Please remember, my King, that this is a holy and necessary war. The enemies of our holy faith may be weakened and the land that they have seized may be taken. Where God is now currently condemned, blasphemed and despised; he may once again be praised, adored, and loved. Bear this in mind and keep on fighting as our former glorious kings did in long sieges and terrible battles. But do not believe, my Lord, that these battles can wait much longer. The Moors can survive on little bread, and find ways to grow some crops. [Furthermore] you cannot fully control the seas and it could very well be that Moors from across the sea, feeling for the suffering of their fellow believers in the peninsula, will come to their aid. You must be wise and prepared as a good knight would be.

Source H

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End of prescribed subject 2

Prescribed subject 3: The move to global war

Read sources I to L and answer questions 9 to 12. The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Events: Pearl Harbor (1941).

Source I An extract from a US government proposal delivered to the Empire of Japan on 26 November 1941, “Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan.” (Known as “The Hull Note”.)

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor [try] to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States.

Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement in which each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territory of French Indochina.

The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support militarily, politically, or economically any Government or regime in China other than the national Government of the Republic of China.

Source J

Removed for copyright reasons

Source K Harry A Gailey, a professor of military history, in the academic book *The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay* (1995).

The [Japanese] army representatives were unanimous [united] in demanding war with the United States. [General] Tojo [the Japanese Prime Minister] understood that Japan's ... [limited] oil supply, combined with the notorious bad weather, would make the Pearl Harbor attack almost impossible if postponed past the target date of ... (7 December Hawaii time) ...

While high-level Japanese officials had been confronting the hard choices of peace or war and their armed forces were preparing for conflict, ... [the Americans] seemed ... [completely] unaware of the potential consequences of President Roosevelt's embargo ... Again and again [US Secretary of State] Hull ... insisted upon a complete Japanese withdrawal from both China and Indochina. Perhaps the [earlier] proposed meeting between ... [the US and Japan would have settled nothing, as Hull claimed. But America refused even to negotiate].

As early as his first meeting with ... [the Japanese Ambassador] on 8 March, Hull was ... [concerned] that his policy might lead to war with the Japanese. Later it was obvious ... that only a Japanese withdrawal from China would have ... [prevented] war.

Perhaps it is too much to say, in retrospect, that anyone in the US government wanted war with Japan, but obviously little was done to ... [prevent] it. At the same time that the hard-line diplomatic policy was being pursued, there was ... [a lack of action] at all levels in Washington and Honolulu.

Source L David J Lu, a professor of Japanese history, writing in the academic book *From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan's Entry into World War II* (1961).

General Tojo later explained that the decision to attack was adopted in view of the tense international situation due to the economic sanctions imposed by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. American and British preparations for war, difficulties in the negotiations with the United States, and no clear means of settling the China Incident also contributed. It was therefore necessary to prepare for war and yet continue the diplomatic conversations. The deadline for the negotiations was set because November would be the best month for landing operations. December would be possible but difficult, January would be impossible because of the northeast monsoons. Japan wanted the United States to express its views regarding three major points of difference between the two governments: (1) the withdrawal of troops from China, (2) Japan's commitments under the Tripartite Pact, and (3) equal access to international trade. Japan avoided specific commitments on all major issues, and so did the United States. In Japanese eyes, the United States Government was not willing to give the specific answers that Japan was looking for. Thus, negotiations were getting nowhere.

End of prescribed subject 3

Turn over

Prescribed subject 4: Rights and protest

Read sources M to P and answer questions 13 to 16. The sources and questions relate to case study 2: Apartheid South Africa (1948–1964) — The role and significance of key actors/groups: Key individuals: Nelson Mandela.

Source M Tom Lodge, a professor of history, writing in the academic book *Mandela: A Critical Life* (2006).

Even though several African National Congress (ANC) leaders, including Nelson Mandela, had at least thought about the possibility of an armed offensive against apartheid for several years, they still encountered considerable opposition to their proposal. At the end of June 1961, Mandela argued his case at a meeting of the ANC’s National Working Committee ... Albert Luthuli was reluctantly persuaded [by Mandela] to approve the establishment of a new military organisation called the MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe – “Spear of the Nation”) that would function separately from the ANC, although ultimately it would be subject to the ANC’s authority ... Mandela suggested the name for the new organisation: “we must have an African name” he said ... It was agreed that Mandela would form the MK and appoint his own staff. For the time being, it was decided, the MK would engage only in very carefully controlled sabotage operations designed to avoid any casualties ... Mandela was not a direct participant in any of the sabotage ... [The ANC decided] to send Mandela abroad to persuade African governments to help with weapons and training facilities that the MK would need.

[Sources: Tom Lodge, *Mandela A Critical Life* © Tom Lodge 2006.
Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.

Matthew, Joe (1994) Interview with Philip Bonner, Cape Town, 18 August 1994.
Transcript held at the William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand.]

Source N Photograph of an anti-apartheid demonstration outside the court in Pretoria in support of Nelson Mandela and his colleagues on the day of the Rivonia Trial verdict in 1964. The sign reads “Our future is bright”.



Source O Kenneth S Broun, a professor of Law, describing the Rivonia Trial 1963–1964 in his book *Saving Nelson Mandela: The Rivonia Trial and the Fate of South Africa* (2012).

Mandela’s defence lawyer announced: “The defence case will commence with a statement by Nelson Mandela who personally took part in the establishment of the MK, and who will be able to inform the court of the beginnings of that organisation.” ... A few minutes after beginning his speech, Mandela made an admission [to the court] sufficient to condemn him to death: “Some of the things so far told to the court are true and some are untrue. I do not, however, deny that I planned sabotage”. However, he argued, planning for it was “a result of calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of my people by the Whites” ... [Mandela stated that] from its formation in 1912, the ANC had wanted political relief from the oppression of black people in South Africa until 1961. The government rejected all of its attempts ... “It was only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred [blocked] to us, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle, and to form the MK.”

[Source: Kenneth S. Broun *Saving Nelson Mandela The Rivonia Trial and the Fate of South Africa* Copyright © 2012 by Kenneth S. Broun. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.]

Source P

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End of prescribed subject 4

Turn over

Prescribed subject 5: Conflict and intervention

Read sources Q to T and answer questions 17 to 20. The sources and questions relate to case study 2: Kosovo (1989–2002) — Causes of the conflict: Role and significance of Slobodan Milosevic and Ibrahim Rugova.

Source Q Ibrahim Rugova, President of Kosovo from March 2002 until his death in 2006, testifying before the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (3 May 2002).

The first objective of this party [Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)] was to establish democracy in Kosovo, to start a democratic life for all its citizens. It aimed to give Kosovo a republic status equal to the other republics in the former Federation, because, as I said, Kosovo had been stripped of its autonomy. Then [after the 1991 referendum] we were striving to build an independent Kosovo — with rights for all its citizens. This was the main and initial goal, but the main thing was to defend the Kosovar people who were endangered at that time ...

Our position was that independence should be achieved by peaceful, diplomatic, and democratic methods and violence should not be used ...

The LDK started organizing solidarity actions to help people who were left without jobs, people who were dismissed from their jobs. It also organized society at large, keeping education and health and other areas of life going, such as culture and sport. And at that time, we also started collecting a tax, not a compulsory tax, but what we called a “solidarity tax”. It mainly concentrated on helping people with food, clothing and things that they needed, because people who had worked for years were now homeless and could not earn a living.

Source R Photograph of Ibrahim Rugova (centre) with United States envoy, Richard Holbrooke, (right) and British Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Brian Donnelly, (left) in Pristina (10 October 1998).



Source S Louis Sell, a professor of International Studies, writing in the academic book *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (2002).

Rugova possessed an iron [strong] determination to resist Serbian oppression. His choice of nonviolent tactics came from a desire to avoid the bloodshed that would accompany any effort to oppose the Serbs through violent means. Rugova himself described his approach as “a war without arms [weapons].” ...

[However] Rugova’s mistake was in believing in the international community too much and especially the United States—which had a special relationship with Kosovo because of its early support for human rights in the province ... Rugova and his Kosovo Albanian supporters experienced delay and disappointment. Once war broke out in the rest of Yugoslavia, Kosovo virtually disappeared from the media and the focus of international peace negotiators. Only when Kosovo Albanians had finally decided “enough is enough” and begun to shoot back at their Serb oppressors, did the international community refocus on Kosovo. By then it was too late for a peaceful solution.

Source T David L Phillips, a university professor, writing in the academic book *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention* (2012).

Plans to set up a U.S. Information Center in Pristina were announced on January 9, 1996 ... “This is a historic day for Kosovo,” said Ibrahim Rugova. “We are for a peaceful solution to the Kosovo problem based on the political will of its people ...” Rugova maintained that this was a major diplomatic success for the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) in internationalizing the Kosovo issue and gaining recognition ... The establishment of the U.S. Information Center was a clear result of the LDK’s internationalization strategy. However, it did not silence Rugova’s critics. The head of the Kosovo Students Union stated, “We thought that the LDK was too passive. It relied too much on international factors. Rugova created the illusion that the international community would resolve the crisis and that independence would come as a gift.” Kosovo Albanians were losing faith in the international community. An increasing number became radicalized as social and economic conditions deteriorated and human rights conditions worsened. It became less likely that their political objectives would be achieved by peaceful means.

End of prescribed subject 5

References:

- Source B** After Benjamin West PRA - Prince John's Submission to Richard I, 1795, Line engraving, 28.6 x 20.9 cm. Photo credit: © Royal Academy of Arts, London.
- Source C** The Internet Medieval Sourcebook, *William of Newburgh: Book Four*, Available at: <https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/williamofnewburgh-four.asp#34> [Accessed 09 March 2021]. Source adapted.
- Source E** Max von Habsburg *Spain in the Age of Discovery, 1469–1598 A/AS Level History for AQA Student Book*, © Cambridge University Press 2015. Reproduced with permission of The Licensor through PLSclear.
- Source F** Iberia in 1492. Map of the Iberian Peninsula, 1270–1492, showing the kingdoms of Portugal, Castile, Navarre, Granada, Aragon, and Majorca. Available at: <https://www.ncpedia.org/media/map/iberia-1492> [Accessed 03 March 2021]. Source adapted.
- Source G** *Epístolas y otros varios tratados de Mosen Diego de Valera*. c1485. National Library of Spain, from a printed copy in Madrid, 1878. Available at: <http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?lang=es&id=0000092867&page=1> [Accessed 09 March 2021]. Translated from Spanish by IBO, 2021.
- Source I** Department of State Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 129, Dec. 13, 1941. United States Note to Japan, “Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan”, 26 November 1941. Available at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Hull_note [Accessed 09 March 2021]. Source adapted.
- Source K** Excerpt(s) from *WAR IN THE PACIFIC: FROM PEARL HARBOR TO TOKYO BAY* by Harry A. Gailey, copyright © 1995 by Harry A. Gailey. Used by permission of Presidio Press, an imprint of Random House, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.
- Source L** Lu, D.J., 1961. *From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan's Entry into World War II*. Washington DC: Public Affairs Press. pp. 201, 207–8. Source adapted.
- Source M** Tom Lodge, *Mandela A Critical Life* © Tom Lodge 2006. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.
- Matthew, Joe (1994) Interview with Philip Bonner, Cape Town, 18 August 1994. Transcript held at the William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand.
- Source N** AP Images/ANP.
- Source O** Kenneth S. Broun *Saving Nelson Mandela The Rivonia Trial and the Fate of South Africa* Copyright © 2012 by Kenneth S. Broun. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.
- Source Q** United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, PROSECUTOR vs. SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ, CASE IT-02-54, Testimony of Ibrahim Rugova in IT-02-54-T (ICTY), 3 May 2002.
- Source R** Reuters, 1998. Ethnic Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova (center) holds hands with U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke and British Ambassador to Yugoslavia Brian Donnelly in Pristina on October 10, 1998. [photograph] (Reuters) Available at: <https://www.rferl.org/a/2247709.html> [Accessed 03 March 2021].
- Source S** Louis Sell, “Milosevic Takes Kosovo”, in *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, pp. 66-94. Copyright 2002, Duke University Press. All rights reserved. Republished by permission of the copyright holder, and the Publisher. www.dukeupress.edu.
- Ibrahim Rugova, *La question du Kosovo*. Fayard, 1994. p. 126.
- Source T** Phillips, David L. foreword by Nicholas Burns., *Liberating Kosovo*, pp. 66-67 (adapted for exam), © 2012 David L. Phillips, by permission of The MIT Press.